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ABSTRACT
From the “right to be left alone” to the “right to selective disclo-
sure”, privacy has long been thought as the control individuals
have over the information they share and reveal about themselves.
However, in a world that is more connected than ever, the choices
of the people we interact with increasingly affect our privacy. This
forces us to rethink our definition of privacy. We here formalize and
study, as local and global node- and edge-observability, Bloustein’s
concept of group privacy. We prove edge-observability to be inde-
pendent of the graph structure, while node-observability depends
only on the degree distribution of the graph. We show on syn-
thetic datasets that, for attacks spanning several hops such as those
implemented by social networks and current US laws, the pres-
ence of hubs increases node-observability while a high clustering
coefficient decreases it, at fixed density. We then study the edge-
observability of a large real-world mobile phone dataset over a
month and show that, even under the restricted two-hops rule,
compromising as little as 1% of the nodes leads to observing up to
46% of all communications in the network. More worrisome, we also
show that on average 36% of each person’s communications would
be locally edge-observable under the same rule. Finally, we use real
sensing data to show how people living in cities are vulnerable to
distributed node-observability attacks. Using a smartphone app to
compromise 1% of the population, an attacker could monitor the
location of more than half of London’s population. Taken together,
our results show that the current individual-centric approach to
privacy and data protection does not encompass the realities of
modern life. This makes us—as a society—vulnerable to large-scale
surveillance attacks which we need to develop protections against.
1 INTRODUCTION
For reasons ranging from urbanization and rural exodus to the
democratization of communication technologies, we are more con-
nected than ever. For instance, this is particularly visible when
considering the average worldwide degree of separation, i.e. “how
many friend-of-my-friend introductions do I need to get to know
another person”. Proposed in 1929, first measured in 1969, and pop-
ularized by the 1990 play “Six degrees of separation” by John Guare,
the average degree of separation has been dramatically shrink-
ing in the past 50 years, going from 6 steps in 1969 to 3.5 steps
today [2, 11, 33, 34].
Many benefits arise from such connectiveness. Network effects
are believed to be fundamental for the scaling laws emerging in
cities [25] such as the relationship between size of a city and the
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Figure 1: Node- and edge- observability. The center node
is compromised. This makes its direct neighbors, in (very)
light blue, and the edges between the compromised node
and them observable (resp. node- and edge- observability).
The edge linking the (very) light blue nodes is however not
observable. In the 2-hop case, nodes that are neighbors of
nodes neighboring the compromised node become observ-
able.
average GDP of its inhabitants [4, 5] or number of patents produced
per capita [8]. Increased connectiveness allows us to transfer and
share information at unprecedented speed [15, 27].
This increased connectiveness, however, challenges the notion
of privacy as relating solely to an individual and the control she
has over her data. From its first definition as the “right to be left
alone” in Warren and Brandeis’ seminal 1890 article [36] to the
more modern “right to selective disclosure” [9], our definitions of
privacy have been centered on the individual controlling informa-
tion about herself. This individual-centric view is built into many
legal frameworks, including the new European legislation (GDPR)
that states: “‘personal data’ means any information relating to an
identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’)” [26].
In the modern world, our privacy increasingly depends on other
people. Our Facebook friends, people we call or encounter on the
street impact our privacy. Bloustein [6] theorized this in an article
in 1978 introducing, in contrast with the individual right to privacy,
the concept of group privacy. His definition was a first attempt to
recognize that the people surrounding us — our family, friends,
colleagues, but also strangers we share the public space with — and
the decisions they make impact our privacy. When we interact or
are linked with someone, we share private information with one
another. The loss of privacy by one person will therefore impact
the privacy of individuals she’s related to.
Modern day researchers have, however, only investigated group
privacy as the right of individuals to keep their affiliation with a
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group private [13, 21]. The common property of the group can be a
religion, sexual orientation, disease or self-determined [16]. More
technically-inclined researchers have then developed technical so-
lutions to protect this affiliation (e.g. t-closeness [17], group-based
obfuscation [22]). We argue here that this “group membership” def-
inition of group privacy is a departure from Bloustein’s concept
which he specifically defines as the “attribute of individuals in asso-
ciation with one another within a group, rather than an attribute of
the group itself”.
In this paper, we propose a framework to study group privacy
through the lens of the relationships an individual establishes with
others, and to quantify the impact of people’s relationships on their
privacy. We define two attack models (local and global) for measur-
ing the loss of privacy, based on node and edge observability in a
network. We study these models from a theoretical and empirical
point of view, proving theoretical properties of the metrics and
showing the impact of the graph structure on group privacy. We
then use our metrics to study group privacy in two real-world cases:
surveillance on a mobile phone network and sensing people’s loca-
tion through a distributed rogue Wi-Fi attack. Firstly, we show that
compromising 1% of individuals allows an attacker to edge-observe
46% of all communications happening on the network under the
current US 2-hops policy [28, 29]. We find, however, that despite
the presence of hubs in the real phone network, the observability
is curbed by the network’s high clustering, contrarily to previous
work [19]. Secondly, we use real-world sensing data to show that a
distributed rogue Wi-Fi attack scales well. Compromising a small
number of devices in a large city, e.g. through an app, allows an
attacker to monitor the location of a large fraction of its popu-
lation. For example, in London, compromising 1% of the devices
allows an attacker to monitor the location of over half of the city’s
population.
Short Summary of Results.
(1) We propose two models of observability (node- and edge-
observability) that can be used to measure group privacy in
a networked environment.
(2) We study these models from a theoretical perspective and
show that edge-observability is independent of the graph
structure while node-observability only depends on the de-
gree distribution of the graph.
(3) We simulate observability on synthetic networks and show
that attacks spanning several hops severely increase the
observability of the graph especially in the presence of hubs.
(4) We study the observability of communications in a real-
world phone dataset and show that compromising a small
fraction of the nodes leads to a large fraction of the commu-
nications in the network to be observable.
(5) We derive an observability function to estimate the location
privacy risk in contained urban areas and apply it to estimate
the risk of location privacy exposure in large American cities,
showing that large cities are vulnerable to mass surveillance
attacks by compromising only a small number of devices.
2 MODELING GROUP PRIVACY THROUGH
GRAPH OBSERVABILITY
2.1 Threat model
Our framework models group privacy losses in a networked en-
vironment as some of the nodes in a network are compromised
(e.g., they installed a malicious app, they have loose permissions
on Facebook, a judge has ordered mobile phone operators to hand
over their data to the authorities, they have been hacked). We call
these scenarios node-based intrusions. If a node v is compromised,
we consider that the attacker gains access to the communication be-
tween v and its neighbors in the network, as well as any attributes
about v’s neighbors that are available to v . In the k-hops version of
this attack, an adversary can also observe nodes and edges located
at most k hops away from the compromised node (see Figure 1).
In short, an attacker exploits a compromised node to observe and
collect information about its edges and neighboring nodes.
Formally, we consider an undirected graph G = (V ,E), where V
is the set of nodes and E is the set of undirected edges, i.e. unordered
pairs (i, j) ∈ E with i, j ∈ V . A set of nodes Vc ⊂ V is compromised,
allowing an attacker to observe all their connected edges and nodes
up to some number of hops; conversely, Vc ≜ V \Vc is the set of
non-compromised nodes which induces a set of observed edges Eo
and a set of observed nodes Vo , defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Observed Nodes). The set of observed nodes after
k hops, V ko , contains all nodes that are at a distance at most k from
one compromised node:
V ko ≜ {u ∈ V \Vc : ∃v ∈ Vc ,d(u,v) ≤ k}
For simplicity, we define:
Vo ≜ V 1o = {u ∈ V \Vc : ∃v ∈ neiдh(u), v ∈ Vc }
We chooseVo to contain only non-compromised nodes, allowing
us to look at |Vo | as the “information gain” for the attacker from
having access to |Vc | compromised nodes.
Definition 2.2 (Observed Edges). The set of observed edges after
k hops Eko contains all edges that are connected to at least one node
within distance k − 1 of one compromised node:
Eko ≜ {(u,v) ∈ E : ∃w ∈ Vc ,
d(u,w) ≤ k − 1 ∨ d(v,w) ≤ k − 1}
For simplicity, we define:
Eo ≜ E1o = {(u,v) ∈ E : u ∈ Vc ∨v ∈ Vc }
Definition 2.3 (Edge-set of a Node). We define the set of all edges
incident to a node v ∈ V :
E[v] = {(v,u) ∈ E}.
We finally define two models of observability, edge-based and
node-based observability, both assuming an attacker has access
to a random set of nodes Vc . In the edge-observability model, the
attacker is interested in learning information that is transmitted
between nodes; while in the node-observability model, the attacker
is interested in learning attributes of nodes. Note that we here focus
on non-targeted node-based intrusions and their impact on global
and local observability. Indeed, in many real-world scenarios includ-
ing the one we present here, these attacks are fairly opportunistic:
people who installed an app, who clicked on a phishing link and
entered their password, etc. We therefore model nodes as having a
uniform probability of being compromised. Our model is applicable
to more advanced, targeted, attacks e.g. targeting highly connected
nodes or actively trying to infect neighboring nodes but we do not
study them here.
In each of these two models, we will differentiate between two
different risks: the global and local surveillance. Global observability
measures the privacy risk over the entire population, while local
observability describes the risk for a random individual.
2.2 Edge-Observability
The edge-observability of a graph pertains to the attacker’s ability to
obtain knowledge about connections happening in the network (i.e.
the edges of the graph). For instance, if someone’s e-mail account is
compromised, all her communications with her contacts are visible
to an attacker. A fixed number (nc = |Vc |) of random nodes in
the network (Vc ) are compromised resulting in a fraction of all the
edges in the network to be observable to an attacker.
Definition 2.4. Global Edge-Observability. The global edge-
observability of a graph ρ∗e is defined as the average fraction of the
edges that the attacker can observe:
ρ∗e = E
[ |Eo |
|E |
]
However, in some scenarios, one might be more interested in
the fraction of the communication of a non-compromised indi-
vidual in the network that are compromised. We call this local
edge-observability.
Definition 2.5. Local Edge-Observability. The local edge-ob-
servability ρe of a node u is defined as the expected fraction of the
edge-set of a node u that the attacker can observe:
ρe (u) = E
[ |E[u] ∩ Eo |
|E[u]|
]
= E
[ |Eo [u]|
|E[u]|
]
Definition 2.6. Local Edge-Observability of a Graph. The lo-
cal edge-observability of the graph ρe is defined as the expected av-
erage (over the nodes) local edge-observability among non-compromised
nodes:
ρe = E

1
|Vc |
∑
u ∈Vc
|Eo [u]|
|E[u]|

2.3 Node-Observability
The node-observability of a graph quantifies an attacker’s ability to
obtain knowledge about the attributes of an individual (i.e. a node
of the graph) using their relationship with compromised nodes.
This could happen, for instance, in a social network where users
reveal some information about themselves to their friends or to
the friends of their friends. An app installed by some users with
loose permissions could observe their friends’ profiles, leading to
observation of a much larger fraction of the network than just the
app’s users. One node is observable if (at least) one of its neigh-
bors in the graph (1-hop) or a neighbor of its neighbors (2-hop) is
compromised.
Definition 2.7. Global Node-Observability. The global node-
observability of a graph ρ∗v is defined as the average fraction of
nodes an attacker can observe.
ρ∗v = E
[ |Vc | + |Vo |
|V |
]
Definition 2.8. Local Node-Observability. The local node-ob-
servability of a nodeu is defined as the probability thatu is observed:
ρv (u) = P [u ∈ Vo | u < Vc ]
Definition 2.9. Local Node-Observability of a Graph. The lo-
cal node-observability of a graph ρv is defined as the expected
average (over all nodes) local node-observability among all the
non-compromised nodes in the graph.
ρv = E

1
|Vc |
∑
u ∈Vc
P [u ∈ Vo | u < Vc ]

All of our metrics are functions of nc = |Vc | to [0, 1]. Hence, for
one particular graphG with |V | = n and anymetricmG (nc ), one can
draw the observability curve as
( nc
n ,mG (nc )
)
for nc = 0, 1, . . . ,n
to represent the evolution of the privacy risk with the number of
compromised nodes. The Area under Observability Curve (AUOC)
summarizes the information given by this curve, and is defined as
1
n
∑n
nc=0mG (nc ), which we approximate by∫ 1
0 mG ( xn )dx . This metric, between 0.5 and 1, quantifies how much
the observability deviates from the curve mG (x) = x , which is
the baseline for privacy risk (i.e. compromising a fraction x of the
population yields to observation of a fraction x of the elements —
edges, nodes — considered).
3 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we prove theoretical properties of node- and edge-
observability and empirically study their behaviour over various
synthetic networks.
3.1 Theoretical Properties of Observability
In the previous section, we introduced four metrics to describe
the privacy impact of node-based intrusions. We hereafter derive
closed-form expressions for these metrics, which allow us to prove
several propositions for the 1-hop case.
3.1.1 Edge-observability.
Proposition 3.1. The global edge-observability of a graph G
grows quadratically with nc , and depends only on the number of
nodes n = |V | and the number of compromised nodes nc . Furthermore,
for any graph family, the AUOC tends to 23 as n grows.
Proof. This is obtained by developing the definition:
ρ∗e = E
[ |Eo |
|E |
]
=
1
|E |E [|Eo |]
One can write |Eo | as the sum over all edges of whether this edge is
in Eo :
E [|Eo |] = E
[∑
e ∈E
I {e ∈ Eo }
]
=
∑
e ∈E
E [I {e ∈ Eo }]
E [I {e ∈ Eo }] = P [e ∈ Eo ] and, by definition, e = (u,v) ∈ Eo if and
only if u ∈ Vc or v ∈ Vc . Hence:
P [(u,v) ∈ Eo ] = P [u ∈ Vc ∨v ∈ Vc ]
= 1 − P [u < Vc ∧v < Vc ]
= 1 − P [u < Vc ] · P [v < Vc | u < Vc ]
= 1 − ( n−ncn ) · ( n−1−ncn−1 )
As this is independent from the actual edge considered, we can
conclude that:
ρ∗e =
1
|E |E [|Eo |] = 1 −
(n − nc
n
)
·
(
n − 1 − nc
n − 1
)
then,
AUOC =
2
3n − 12
n − 1
And therefore, limn→∞AUOC(n) = 23 . □
Proposition 3.2. The local edge-observability of a graph G is a
linear function of nc and depends only on the number of nodes n and
the number of compromised nodes nc . Furthermore, for any graph
family, the AUOC tends to 12 as n grows.
Proof. Firstly, we redevelop the expression:
ρe =
1
n − nc · E
[∑
u ∈V
|Eo [u]|
|E[u]| · I {u < Vc }
]
Introducing the notation deд(u) for the degree of node u, we can
rewrite it as:
ρe =
1
n − nc
∑
u ∈V
1
deд(u) · E [|Eo [u] · I {u < Vc }]
Observing that:
E [|Eo [u]| · I {u < Vc }] = E [ |Eo [u]| | u < Vc ] · P [u < Vc ]
We can write:
E [ |Eo [u]| | u < Vc ] = ∑v ∈neiдh(u) P [v ∈ Vc | u < Vc ]
=
∑
v ∈neiдh(u) ncn−1
= deд(u) · ncn−1
ρe =
1
n−nc
∑
u ∈V 1deд(u) · deд(u) ·
nc
n−1 · n−ncn
= 1n−nc ·
nc
n−1 · n−ncn · n
=
nc
n−1
Hence, ρe =
nc
n−1 ,AUOC(n) = n2(n−1) and limn→∞ AUOC(n) = 12 .
□
Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 show that both global and local edge-
observability will tend to constant AUOC values (respectively 2/3
and 1/2), and are independent of the number of edges and the
structure of the graph. However, as we will see in the subsection
3.2, this is not true when considering multiple hops.
3.1.2 Node-observability.
Proposition 3.3. The global node-observability of a graph de-
pends only on its number of nodes n, number of compromised nodes
nc , and its degree distribution (deд(u))u ∈V .
Proof. ρ∗v =
nc+E[ |Vo |]
n , with E [|Vo |] = E [
∑
u ∈V I {u ∈ Vo }] =∑
u ∈V P [u ∈ Vo ].
Which can be developed as:
P [u ∈ Vo ]
= P [u < Vc ∧ ∃v ∈ neiдh(u),v ∈ Vc ]
= P [u < Vc ] · P [∃v ∈ neiдh(u),v ∈ Vc | u < Vc ]
=
n−nc
n · (1 − P [∀v ∈ neiдh(u),v < Vc | u < Vc ])
AsVc is an arbitrary selection of nc nodes among n (all selections
being equiprobable), u < Vc makes this a selection of nc nodes
among n − 1. (∀v ∈ neiдh(u),v < Vc ) happens if and only if this
selection is made exclusively from nodes inV \neiдh(u)\{u}, hence
among n − 1 − deд(u) nodes. If nc > n − 1 − deд(u), no selection
is possible, and thus u ∈ Vo with probability 1. For simplicity of
notations, denote D(nc ) = {u ∈ V | deд(u) > n − nc − 1}, the set of
nodes that will be observed with probability 1. Otherwise, with Cnk
the number of subsets of size k of a set of size n:
P [∀v ∈ neiдh(u),v < Vc | u < Vc ] =
C
n−1−deд(u)
nc
Cn−1nc
Yielding, when combining the elements:
ρ∗v =
nc
n +
n−nc
n2 ·(
|D(nc )| +∑u ∈V \D(nc ) (1 − Cn−1−deд(u)ncCn−1nc ))
Which is indeed a function of n, nc and the degree distribution
{deд(u)}u ∈V □
Proposition 3.4. The local node-observability of a graph depends
only on its number of nodes n, number of compromised nodes nc and
its degree distribution (deд(u))u ∈V .
Proof. Using previous results:
ρv =
1
n−nc ·
∑
u ∈V E [P [u ∈ Vo | u < Vc ] · I {u < Vc }]
= 1n−nc
∑
u ∈V P [u ∈ Vo | u < Vc ] · P [u < Vc ]
= 1n−nc ·
n−nc
n ·
∑
u ∈V P [u ∈ Vo | u < Vc ]
In the proof of 3.3, we found a value for P [u ∈ VoP [u ∈ Vo | u < Vc ]]
that depends only on nc ,n and the degree distribution of the graph.
Hence, ρv = 1n ·
∑
u ∈V P [u ∈ Vo ] depends only on nc ,n, and the
degree distribution.
□
Proposition 3.5. (Relationship between local and global node-
observability) Local and global node-observability obey the following
relationship:
ρ∗v =
nc
n
+
n − nc
n
· ρv
Proof. This is a consequence of the expressions found in the
proofs of propositions 3.3 and 3.4. □
Computing node-observability however requires knowing the
full degree distribution of the graph. Degree distributions have been
extensively studied in network science, see e.g. [3, 37].
Figure 2: Global and local edge and node observability for the complete, Erdős-Rényi, Barabási-Albert graph, and Watts-
Strogatz graphs.
3.2 Empirical study of observability
In this section, we study edge- and node-observability on different
families of synthetic networks. We verify empirically the proposi-
tions developed previously and study the impact of the network
structure on edge and node-observability.
We study graphs generated from four models: a complete graph
and three graphs with an average density of 0.015; a Erdős-Rényi
graph (with p = 0.015 - a random graph), Barabási-Albert graph
(withm = 2 - a graph whose degree distribution follows a power
law), and a Watts-Strogatz graph (with k = 5 and p = 0.2 - a graph
designed to have a large number of triangles), each with 250 nodes.
We estimate the node- and edge-observability for each graph type
graph size and number of compromised nodes nc , by repeating the
experiment 500 times and reporting the average curves.
Our implementation of the metrics will be made available online, and submitted to the
Python NetworkX library upon publication.
Additionally, to model the interplay between graph density and
observability, we repeat the entire procedure described above while
varying the density from 0.01 to 0.3. To do so, we vary the proba-
bility of link creation p in the Erdős-Rényi graph, the value of the
m parameter in Barabási-Albert, and the value of the k parameter
in Watts-Strogatz graphs in order to obtain comparable densities.
First, Figure 2 and Figure 3 match our theoretical results: the
global (resp. local) edge-observability has an AUOC of 2/3 (resp. 1/2)
independently of the number of edges in the graph. Furthermore,
as expected, being able to observe 2-hops or 3-hops away from
compromised nodes greatly increases all the metrics considered.
Second, Figure 2 shows that global and local node-observability
behave roughly the same way, especially for small values of nc ,
which is expected by proposition 3.5.
Finally, while the 1-hop behaviour is roughly the same for all
types of graphs (except the complete one), we observe significant
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Figure 3: Observability of graphs with varying density. We
compute the global and local edge- and node-observability
of a A: random graph, B: Barabasi-Albert graph, and C:
Watts-Strogatz graph with varying probability of each edge
to exist p = [.01, .3].
differences between them when considering 2-hops and 3-hops
intrusions. The AUOC of Barabasi-Albert graph is larger than that of
random graphs, which in turn has larger AUOC thanWatts-Strogatz
graphs. An explanation for this can be found in the structure of
these graphs. Indeed, Barabasi-Albert graphs contain very high
degree nodes called hubs. This high degree makes them likely to be
observed (connected to a compromised node) which in turn allows
the adversary to observe all their connections (2-hops) and the
connections of their connections (3-hops), strongly increasing the
observability of the graph. The impact of hubs on observability and
surveillancewas first discussed in PNAS [19].Watts-Strogatz graphs
present a lattice-like structure with high clustering coefficient. This
means thatmost nodes arewell connected to close neighbors but not
to the rest of the graph. Compromising a node will therefore have
a very local impact on observability, as opposed to spanning over
the entire graph and limit the observability of the graph. Random
graphs, which do not exhibit large hubs or local lattice structure,
logically have observability in between the two previous “extreme”
cases.
4 APPLICATION: GROUP PRIVACY IN PHONE
NETWORKS
The list of who we talked to on the phone—the edges of our social
graph—is sensitive and considered private by 63% of Americans [30].
It is, however, arguably loosely protected by current regulations.
Tapping a phone is one of the most common means of surveillance,
with national laws allowing the authorities to surveil the phones
of suspects—and therefore all the communications they have with
third parties—but often also the people who they communicate with.
For example, US regulation allowed intelligence agencies to collect
phone records of people up to three hops from suspects. After the
Snowden affair in 2013, this number was reduced to two hops [19].
Similarly, in an attempt to curb illegal immigration, the US Border
Patrol was allowed to use call logs to confirm the legal status of
their potential target as well as to search for other potential illegal
immigrants among the target’s contacts [14].
In this section, we use real-world mobile phone data to study
the potential of surveillance through node-based intrusions. Our
dataset comprises four weeks of domestic intra-company commu-
nications phone logs (calls and texts) of 1.4 million customers of
a mobile phone provider, resulting in a social graph containing 6
million edges. To the best of our knowledge, the only similar study
has been conducted by Mayer et al. [19] and concluded that hubs
increase the number of nodes that can be reached through 3 hops.
Their analysis, however, relies on a fairly disconnected dataset of
less than 1000 users collected through an app. The small size of
the dataset and sampling bias prevents them from quantifying the
potential of node-based intrusions for mass and targeted surveil-
lance, from comparing their results to graph models, and to show
the importance of the graph’s clustering coefficient.
Figure 4 shows that, under the previous 3-hops policy and by
compromising 1% of the population (with a seven days time win-
dow) e.g. through warrants, one could surveil a striking 84% of all
the communications (global edge-observability) and 73% of the com-
munications of a specific person (local edge-observability). While
the new 2-hops policy decreases these numbers, we show that un-
der it, one can still surveil 32% of all the communications (global
edge-observability) and 24% of the communications of a specific
person (local edge-observability). This article is the first one to
present such a large-scale study of these numbers.
Figure 5 compares the AUOC for the real phone network built
using 7 days of data with the AUOC obtained using the four graph
models used before (each with the same number of nodes and
density than the phone network). We observe, as before, that the
Barabasi-Albert graph has a higher AUOC (both for edge- and
node-observability for 2 and 3 hops) than the random one which in
turn has a higher AUOC than the Watts-Strogatz graph. Our phone
graph then falls similarly between the hubs-powered Barabasi-
Albert graph and the triangle-hindered Watts-Strogatz graph for
local and global observability.
This is explained by Figure 6 and Table 1. Figure 6 shows that
our phone graph has a degree distribution very similar to the one
of a Barabasi-Albert graph, including hubs, which will increase
observability. Table 1 shows that our phone graph has a clustering
coefficient and modularity [23] that are fairly similar to the ones
that can be observed in a Watts-Strogatz graph. Both modularity
and clustering coefficient will reduce the observability of the graph.
Finally, Figure 4 shows how the AUOC and edge-observability of
our phone graph evolves as the time window considered increases.
It shows that the number of nodes that can be mass-observed by
compromising 1% of the nodes under the 2-hops policy reaches
46% after a month while the local edge-observability, the ability
to edge-observe a random node in the network, reaches a striking
36%.
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Figure 4: Global (A) and local (B) AUOC edge-observability
of the real phone network as the observation window in-
creases. Global (C) and local (D) edge-observability when 1%
of the nodes are compromised.
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Figure 5: Area under observability curve (AUOC) for the
real phone network (observation window of 7 days) and syn-
thetic networks with the same number of nodes and edges.
Taken together, our results show that large-scale mobile phone
network are very vulnerable to mass surveillance through node-
based intrusions, especially with more than 1 hops and with long
enough observationwindows.While our results confirmMayer’s [19]
on the impact of hubs on observability using a small dataset, they
show that this impact is hindered by the presence of triangles, a
fact that had not been considered and quantified so far in the debate
on metadata and surveillance. Our results, furthermore, provide a
quantification at large-scale of edge-observability using real data.
They show that it is easy to monitor a large fraction of all the com-
munications occurring in a graph through node-based intrusions
and that even monitoring one individual’s communications is possi-
ble by compromising a relatively small fraction of the nodes in the
graph. This is particularly true if the observation window is long
enough, a fact that has been absent from the surveillance debate so
far.
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Figure 6: Degree distribution for the mobile phone dataset
graph and the random graph models with equal number of
nodes and density. The degree distribution of a Barabasi-
Albert graph appears to be the closest fit to the empirical
distribution.
network type avg. clustering modularity
Phone 1.6 × 10−1 0.72
Random 3.7 × 10−6 0.43
Barabasi-Albert 1.0 × 10−4 0.36
Watts-Strogatz 2.7 × 10−1 0.81
Table 1: Modularity and average clustering for the phone
graph and the three synthetic networks, all with equal num-
ber of nodes and density. Watts-Strogatz’s resulting average
clustering coefficient is the closest one to the one of our
phone network.
5 APPLICATION: GROUP PRIVACY IN
CO-LOCATION NETWORK
Mobility data is considered as some of the most sensitive data
currently being collected. The Electronic Frontier Foundation pub-
lished a list of potentially sensitive professional and personal infor-
mation that could be inferred about an individual from their mobil-
ity information [7]. These include the movements of a competitor
sales force, attendance of a particular church, or an individual’s
presence in a motel or at an abortion clinic.
We here use our framework and real world sensing data to show
that it is possible to observe the location of a large number of people
in a city by compromising a small number of devices. In this tracker
attack, an attacker would compromise people’s smartphone, e.g.
offering a fake “flashlight” app for people to install [10], and use
compromised devices’ GPS location and sensing capabilities to track
nearby uncompromised devices.
Compromised devices can sense uncompromised neighbouring
devices through Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. We believe Wi-Fi attacks to
CCC
O
O
O
O
O
C compromised O observed unobserved observation range
Figure 7: Compromised devices sense the presence of other
devices within the observation range. This creates, for each
time period, a co-location graph on which we compute local
and global node observability.
be more likely as they are already widely used by commercial com-
panies, e.g. Transport For London (TFL) [18], to track their users.
Wi-Fi attacks could be either passive, where the app simply ob-
serves probe requests that mobile phones send to sense nearby
Wi-Fi hotspots (as smartphones search for Wi-Fi networks with
high frequency and, by default, even if the user disables Wi-Fi [31]),
or active, running a fake hotspot with a common SSID (e.g. attwifi,
xfinitywifi) to entice nearby phones to connect. While more com-
plex, the latter would bypass MAC address randomization used by
some OSes for privacy protection as phones use their real identifier
when connecting to a network. We believe such tracking attacks to
be likely given the large number of companies with similar access
to user devices (e.g. through code embedding in third-party apps)
and strong interest in location data [1].
We first estimate the real world effectiveness (node-observability)
of a tracker attack using a dataset collected as part of the Copen-
hagen Networks Study [32]. The dataset contains mobility infor-
mation of about 600 students at a European university collected
over a month (retrieved via GPS, Wi-Fi, or a combination of the
two) along with Bluetooth sensing data (every 5 min). Using this
data, we build hourly co-location graphs with edges between all the
devices that sensed another within that hour (Figure 7). Repeating
this analysis for different hours and regions of 1 km2 allows us to
estimate the node-observability of such tracker attack. Note that
Wi-Fi has a larger range than Bluetooth, making our estimates a
lower bound on node-observability.
Figure 8 shows how node-observability increases with the num-
ber of compromised nodes per km2. The probability of a specific
node to be sensed by a compromised node (local node-observability)
is higher than 60%with as little as 200 compromised devices per km2.
We approximate local node-observability fornc compromised nodes
per km2 using LNO_approx(nv ) = 0.13 log(nv ) − 0.05 (R2 = 0.9).
Using this approximation and census data [24, 35], we evaluate
the feasibility of tracking attacks in four large cities: Chicago, Los
Angeles, London, and Singapore (see Algorithm 1). Figure 9 shows
that node-observability is high for all cities. For instance, in London,
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Figure 8: Global (A) and local (B) node-observability of co-
location dataset. The local node-observability represents the
mean likelihood of a person being observed by one of the
compromised nodes, with respect to the density of compro-
mised nodes per km2.
an attacker can observe the location of 56% of individuals (resp. 84%
- local node-observability) by compromising only 1% (resp. 10%)
of the London population. For instance, the Judy malware [20] for
Android was recently estimated to have infected 36 million devices
worldwide, a fake flashlight app collected data from tens of millions
of users [12], while e.g. UK start-up Tamoco has deals with 1000
android apps to embed their code allowing them to compromise
100 million devices. This makes the node-intrusion tracking attacks
in large densely-populated cities a major concern moving forward.
Figure 9 finally shows that the local node-observability in cities
can be reasonably well approximated by assuming that the dis-
tribution of the population per km2 in the city follows an expo-
nential distribution, where the parameter λ is the density of the
entire city λ = populationarea . This allows us to estimate the local node-
observability of a city, the vulnerability of a person to be observed,
by knowing only the population and area of the city.
Algorithm 1 Local node-observability of a city
1: procedure LocalNodeObsCity(nB ,B,x )
2: pop ← ∑i Bi
3: obs ← 0
4: for i = 1, . . . ,nB do
5: mi ← x · Bi
6: obs + = LNO_approx(mi ) · Bi
7: end for
8: return obs/pop
9: end procedure
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a framework to study group privacy in
the original sense given to it by Bloustein, i.e. the impact of the
people we interact with on our privacy. We discussed two attack
models on a graph, where an adversary compromises a random
fraction of the nodes, allowing her to observe uncompromised edges
or nodes. Our framework also handles cases in which the attacker
can access information several hops away from the compromised
nodes, in line with current regulation.
We prove that, for 1 hop, edge-observability is constant and inde-
pendent of the graph structure, while node-observability requires
knowledge of only the graph’s degree distribution. We show em-
pirically on synthetic graphs that adding hops severely increases
observability, particularly in the presence of hubs in the graph
structure.
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Figure 9: Local node-observability in cities using on cen-
sus data (AUOCC ) and estimated local node observability
(AUOCE ). Inset: distribution of the population per block
We then use our framework to evaluate the success of two possi-
ble attacks, using real-world datasets. Our first attack showed that
over a month of a large-scale phone graph, compromising 1% of
nodes leads to monitoring 98% of all communications on the graph
using 3-hops policy and still a striking 46% of all communications
using the new 2-hops policy. We also show that, while the presence
of hubs increases observability [19], this is balanced by the high
clustering coefficient and prominence of triangles in real-world
phone datasets. This crucial property of human social network has
so far been ignored in the debate on surveillance using node-based
intrusions.
Our second attack modeled a population-wide location-tracking
attack using a rogue smartphone app. We estimate local-node ob-
servability using a real-world co-location and sensing dataset. We
then use this to show that, by compromising 1% of the London
population, an attacker could observe the location of more than
half of the city’s population.
These results show that our connectiveness makes us and our
societies very vulnerable to group privacy intrusions where only
a small number of compromised nodes might impact the privacy
of a large fraction of the population. This makes such intrusions
potential candidates for massive population-wide surveillance and
emphasize the importance of rethinking of definition of privacy
beyond the current individual-centric model.
Limitations. We believe our framework suffers from two main
limitations:
(1) The choice of selecting compromised nodes at random, while
realistic for our two applications, does not encompass ev-
ery possible—or even probable—attack. However, most of
our mathematical definitions do not rely on this assumption
(while propositions 3.1 to 3.5 do), hence the overall frame-
work could be extended to use different compromised nodes
distribution or targeting.
(2) Differences in lifestyle, geography, type of population might
introduce bias in our extrapolation of local node-observability
from the CNS dataset to large cities. We argue, however, that
the probability for an individual to be observed by a device
within 1 km2, as a function of the number of compromised
devices, is roughly invariant of the population in the cell.
This is, however, the first attempt — to the authors’ knowl-
edge — at estimating the risk of mass surveillance in large
cities based on actual co-location data.
Future directions. We propose the following directions for future
work on group privacy and surveillance:
(1) Application of our framework to other datasets and other
forms of data, including social networks such as Facebook,
to observe how their structure makes them more or less
vulnerable to mass surveillance.
(2) An analysis on how observability evolves in mobile phone
datasets when considering longer periods of time and dif-
ferent countries, as well as the design of a mobile phone
graphs model that replicates both properties of the data
(hubs, clustering coefficient) while capturing the local and
global observability of the graph.
(3) Proposition of a theoretical population model for cities, that
incorporates the movement of inhabitants within cells and
gives us a different estimate of node-observability in cities.
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